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Purpose 
 Supply chains are fundamentally complex (Vachon and 
Klassen, 2002; Galbraith 1973) 
 
 Are supply chains managed differently based upon 
the susceptibility of the supply chain to 
 Endogenous disruptions? 
 Exogenous disruptions?  
 
 Contract design as a risk management strategy 
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Supply Chain Risk 
 Endogenous 
 Supply risks 
 Resource related 
 Demand risks 
 Market related 
 Complexity of the 
product, number of 
exchange partners 
exacerbates risk (Flynn and 
Flynn 1999) 
 Might be decreased by 
the firm (Folta 1998) 
 
 Exogenous 
 Discrete events (Trkman and 
Mccormack 2009) 
 Unpredictable shocks 
 Continuous risks 
 More stable e.g., political 
environment 
 Largely unaffected by 
firm actions (Folta 1998) 
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Risk Management Strategies 
 Endogenous risk management 
 Supply risks: Hedge (multiple suppliers), internally produce 
 Demand risks: Postpose production, maintain inventory (Manuj, 
Esper, and Stank 2014) 
 Share information with SC partners 
 
 Exogenous risk management 
 Assume and internalize risk 
 Mutual understanding of risks among partners to lower 
transaction costs as much as possible (Weber and Mayer 2014) 
 Flexibility in contract, contingency plans (Brown, et al 2015) 
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Public Sector Supply Chains 
 Public managers tend to be more externally focused 
(Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004) 
 
 Inefficient SC can thrive if valued by/benefit powerful 
actors (Kim and Brown 2010; Eckerd and Snider 2016) 
 
 Public sector SC behave more/less like private sector 
depending upon exogenous disruption 
 
 Contract design as a risk management strategy 
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Hypotheses 
1) Fixed price contracts will be favored over other 
contract types when both endogenous risk and 
exogenous risk are low. 
 
2) Cost reimbursement contracts will be favored over 
other contract types when endogenous risk is high and 
exogenous risk is low. 
 
3) Award/incentive fee contracts will be favored over 
other contract types when both endogenous risk and 














Measures and Method 
Dependent variable 
 Contract pricing type: 1 Fixed price, 2 
Incentive/award fee, 3 Cost 
reimbursement, 4 Time and material 
 
Explanatory variables 
 Endogenous risk: 
 Product complexity 
 Exogenous risk: 
 Contract value: total dollars obligated 
(log) 
 Market competition: number of offers 
received (log) 
 Competitive limitation: coded 1 if the 
contract is a set aside 
Control variables 
 Contract length: total length of 
contract in years 
 Unrestricted competition: coded 
1 if full and open 
 DOD 
 FY dummies 
 
Method 
 Multinomial logistical regression, 






H1: Fixed price contracts will be favored over other 
contract types when both endogenous risk and 




Contract value (-) 
H2: Cost reimbursement contracts will be favored 
over other contract types when endogenous risk is 




Contract value (+FP/-AI) 
 
H3: Award/incentive fee contracts will be favored 
over other contract types when both endogenous risk 




Contract value (+) 
 
Discussion 
 Endogenous risk  
 Fixed price more likely for less complex products/services 
 Cost reimbursement more likely for most complex 
products/services 
 
 Exogenous risk  
 If characterize high dollar value as a proxy for political 
attention, then incentive/award fee most likely 
 If characterize market strength as a proxy for political 
attention, then results are not clear 
 
 Findings suggest relationship between varying types of 
SC risk and contract design choices 
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